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International Competition Below the Threshold of War: Toward
a Theory of Gray Zone Conflict
Abstract
Drawing on existing literature, this research offers a theoretical delineation of the gray
zone conflict, that is, conflict below the threshold of armed conflict. It begins by identifying
the characteristic features attributed to the gray zone to propose a definition of the
concept. It then situates gray zone conflict within the framework of the International
Relations theory of Realism before setting out the main lines of strategic action used.
Lastly, it examines the various levels of escalation that can arise in conflict of this nature.
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Introduction
Periodically, the media refer to a return to the Cold War as a graphic
way of describing the growing competition between great powers.1
Rivalry is an observable phenomenon and features increasingly in the
strategy documents of the great powers.2 However, academic literature
lacks a commonly accepted term to describe this kind of competition
below the threshold of armed conflict. This article uses gray zone
conflict, a term used in the United States defense community, in
military publications and by think tanks.3 The image of gray zone
conveys the ambiguous and gradual nature of the space in the
intermediate conflict spectrum between peaceful competition and
armed conflict. Setting aside the question of the term’s
appropriateness, gray zone literature is assisting our understanding of
rivalry waged below the threshold of armed conflict. While the reality
described by the phrase gray zone conflict is not in itself new (the Cold
War fits the definition readily), the characterization and application of
the concept are improving.
To contribute to the theoretical delineation of the gray zone and
encourage use of the concept in strategic studies, this article undertakes
a review of the literature on such rivalry. Four sections comprise the
research: Part one identifies the characteristic features of the gray zone
and proposes a definition. Part two frames the concept within the
broader theory of offensive realism, which focuses on the politics of
competition between great powers and the strategies used to increase
relative power. The third section identifies the lines of strategic action
in gray zone conflict, complementing and broadening realism theory
which explains the origins of rivalry between great powers yet pays less
attention to its manifestations. The concept of gray zone not only
accommodates offensive realism theory but also enriches it. The final
section outlines various levels of escalation in gray zone conflict.

Defining Characteristics of Gray Zone Conflict
In most cases gray zone literature does not offer an explicit definition of
the concept but merely outlines its main characteristics. The reason for
this is that many works focus on the study of specific cases, centered
largely on Russia and China, rather than theorizing on the gray zone
phenomenon per se. Before suggesting a definition, it is therefore
appropriate to identify and summarize the common aspects identified.
1
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Ambiguity
The gray zone is neither peaceful relations nor armed conflict. In gray
zone conflict, strategic competition between two or more states (with
their respective conflict dyads) takes place below the threshold of
armed conflict. The essentially non-violent nature of the conflict, save
for sporadic episodes involving limited use of violence, is usually
deliberate on the part of the parties, particularly the instigator. 4 The
aim is to avoid crossing red lines that would trigger a military
escalation with high costs and unforeseeable consequences.5 Moreover,
given that the conflict takes place below the threshold of war, one actor
can challenge another possessing greater military power in a calculated
move based on the stability-instability paradox. The fact that one state
enjoys escalation dominance at one level of conflict does not prevent its
rivals from taking the fight to lower levels and indeed may even
encourage them to do so.6
Using the number of deaths in combat of the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program as the quantitative criterion, distinguishing gray zone conflict
from armed conflict in a dyad of actors became apparent. According to
this database, an armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force
between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one
calendar year. The database also defines war as a state-based conflict or
dyad which reaches at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a specific
calendar year.7 However, beyond the need to adhere or not to this exact
range (which fulfils a need for objective criteria to codify conflicts in a
database), the important aspect to underline is the difference between
an armed conflict/war dyad and a gray zone conflict dyad.
As Figure 1 shows, proxy wars best exemplify the distinction between
the two types of dyads. The armed conflict dyad exists only between the
proxy and the opponent state. The Houthi militias and Saudi military
forces in the war in Yemen are a good example. Meanwhile, the state
that provides aid to the Houthis (Iran) is in a gray zone conflict dyad
with the state fighting the proxy (Saudi Arabia).
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Figure 1. Conflict Dyads in a Proxy War

Source: Author
The real obstacle to identifying the gray zone lies at the other extreme,
that is, in distinguishing a gray zone conflict from peaceful competition
conducted in accordance with decorum and bona fide competition. In
short, competition that takes place in international politics within
broadly accepted parameters. The fact that the criteria are inevitably
subjective is precisely what gives this strategic option one of its
characteristic features: Ambiguity. This deliberate ambiguity makes it
difficult to identify hostile activities and articulate response strategies. 8
Multidimensional or hybrid strategies
Gray zone conflict is the quintessential terrain for what some literature
terms hybrid warfare, a concept acknowledged (in its ‘hybrid threat’
variant) in official statements by the Atlantic Alliance and European
Union.9 The meaning of hybrid warfare has evolved to embrace
different realities in recent years.10 In some of its more recent versions,
it refers to strategies that are multidimensional, comprehensive, and
used in synchronized fashion.11
In effect, characteristic features of gray zone conflict are hybrid
strategies involving the deliberate, multidimensional, and integrated
use of various instruments of power: Political, economic, social,
information, diplomatic as well as military.12 Such strategies seek to
harness opportunities and exploit the vulnerabilities of the opponent in
3
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these different fields to exert coercion and degrade the latter’s political
decision-making process in order to gain a competitive advantage.
On the military level, the distinctive aspect of the strategies is that they
are essentially symbolic and designed for coercion ends. Countries use
them as a marker, to intimidate or obtain advantage in an escalation
and, exceptionally, to support third actors who do use force. Such force
can, on occasions, be large-scale in the framework of a proxy war in a
conflict dyad different to that of the gray zone conflict. Thus, a
characteristic of gray zone conflict is the majority and integrated use of
non-military instruments.
Asymmetry of interests
The conflict revolves around interests that are highly prized by the
party that enters the gray zone. The anticipated benefits exceed the
costs of abandoning the conventional diplomatic route, probing, and
manipulating red lines. The resolve of the gray zone aggressor
constitutes an advantage if there is asymmetry of interests with respect
to the other actor. Where such asymmetry exists, the weaker actor is
more likely to achieve its objectives because it assumes risks and costs
which a more powerful rival less interested in the objective is not
willing to accept. For this reason, anyone operating in a gray zone aims
to avoid threatening the vital or existential interests of the opponent,
making a justified response by the latter more difficult.13 Asymmetry of
interests also affects the response by alliances given that one of their
binding elements is the shared threat perception based on the interests
at stake.14
Gradualism
The conflict instigator usually adopts a long-term perspective and
therefore uses an abundance of interconnected actions designed to
secure gradual gains.15 Gradualism aims to avert robust reactions by
manipulating the opponent’s response threshold while at the same time
turning the strategic situation in the instigator’s favor through the sum
of effects.16 Gradualism reinforces the ambiguity given that the gravity
and inter-connection of the different actions are not always apparent to
the opponent’s political decision-makers, their allies, and their
respective public opinions.17
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Based on the above four common elements, this research uses the
following definition: Within the spectrum of political conflict, the gray
zone is an intermediary space separating competition waged in
accordance with conventional guidelines governing interstate politics
from direct and continued armed confrontation. Gray zone conflict
revolves around an incompatibility perceived as relevant at least in the
eyes of the aggressor. The strategies used are multidimensional and
synchronized (hybrid), and implementation is gradual, usually in
pursuit of long-term goals.

Gray Zone Conflict within the Framework of Offensive
Realism
The literature on gray zone conflict barely addresses its structural
origins beyond general reference to competition between great powers,
which is more a result than a cause. Given this gap, this research
proposes using John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory.18
Conceptually situated within structural realism, offensive realism
focuses on factors pertaining to the level of analysis of the international
system rather than specific factors relating to a specific conflict at the
levels of individual and state analysis, which are crucial for case studies
but are less useful for a general theory.19 The study of international
politics, unsurprisingly, does not have a ‘theory of everything’ to
account satisfactorily for the enormous complexity of the interactions
that arise in said politics and specific theories must therefore be used to
understand certain dimensions of this complexity. Offensive realism is
one of the theories best able to explain conflict between great powers,
which is why it is appropriate to include its perspective in any
theorization of gray zone conflict.20
This does not mean, however, that gray zone theory has little to
contribute to other variants of realism such as classical or neoclassical
realism. It is compatible with these and, indeed, such theories are
appropriate when examining both a state’s external action at a given
point in time and its preference for a particular strategic line of action
in the gray zone. This is because offensive realism forms part of
structural realism, which interprets states’ external behavior at the
level of analysis of the international system. It focuses therefore on the
independent variables belonging to this level, whereas neoclassical
realism takes these and adds intervening variables from the levels of
the analysis of the state and the individual.21
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According to structural realism, two factors determine the international
system:
•

•

international anarchy, the absence of a supranational
authority that acts as an effective guarantor of the security of
states, and
the distribution of relative power among states.

Waltz argues that states pay careful attention to the balance of power to
prevent the emergence of hegemonic powers.22 Disruptions to balance
lead states with less power to join forces to restore it. A strategy aimed
at achieving hegemony is therefore counterproductive in the end as it
prompts other actors to act as counterweights. The structure of the
system offers few incentives for unrestrained increases in power. Other
realist authors such as Barry R. Posen, Jack Snyder, Charles L. Glaser,
Stephen Van Evera, Shiping Tang, and Stephen M. Walt share Waltz’s
reasoning. Walt, however, places emphasis on the threat perception
rather than the distribution of power.23
Mearsheimer challenges this approach, which he calls ‘defensive
realism’, and offers an alternative explanation to which he gives the
name ‘offensive realism’.24 He focuses his analysis on great powers as
they exert the greatest influence over the international system.
According to Mearsheimer, a great power is any state with sufficient
military might to take on the most powerful nation in the world in open
warfare and either defeat it or seriously weaken it. After identifying the
unit of analysis, Mearsheimer sets out five principles:25
•

•

•

•

The international system is anarchic; however, this is not
synonymous with chaos and disorder but rather the absence
of a centralized authority situated above the different states.
Great powers have, by definition, offensive military
capabilities, which they can use to inflict serious harm on
other great powers.
States do not know the intentions of other states. These may
not be hostile, but uncertainty is inevitable. Moreover,
friendly intentions may become unfriendly in time.
The basic goal of any great power is survival, in particular the
preservation of their territorial integrity and political
sovereignty.
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•

Great powers behave as rational actors; they are conscious of
what happens in their environment and calculate
strategically to survive in it.

According to Mearsheimer, the interrelation between these five
principles intensifies competition and mutual mistrust.26 Great powers
can hurt each other; they do not know with certainty the intentions of
others, and no external authority exists on whom they can rely for
protection. In the event of an attack, other states may or may not assist
the attacked state depending on their respective interests. Fear and
uncertainty lead them to be attentive to the distribution of power
within the system. Great powers only feel secure when they are more
powerful than the rest. Hence, since it is difficult to calibrate the
‘adequate’ level of power, not just at present but in the mid to long
term, each feel driven to maximize its share, to become overwhelmingly
superior to other countries and be the hegemonic power in the region.
In turn, powers that achieve hegemony strive to prevent the emergence
of competitors in their region or hegemonic powers in other regions
who might eclipse them in the international system or interfere in their
sphere of influence.27 In order to abort the emergence of ‘peer
competitors’, great powers may act as offshore balancers.28 This has in
part been the policy followed by Washington in seeking to
counterbalance Iran in the Middle East, Russia in its former sphere of
influence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and China in Asia
Pacific.29
Such conduct by great powers affects the international order, which in
a scenario of two or more great powers (bipolar or multipolar) operates
according to the principles of realism. The same is not true of unipolar
orders, where the lack of competition between great powers means that
ideological principles (for instance, American liberalism in the two
decades following the end of the Cold War) prevail in the configuration
of the order. The gradual return to a realistic multipolar order since the
middle of the last decade would account for the rise in gray zone
conflict and the increased attention paid to the concept in current
literature.
Turning to strategies, Mearsheimer notes that throughout history war
has been the primary means of increasing relative power and achieving
territorial expansion, although he acknowledges that it is becoming
increasingly exceptional.30 Mearsheimer does not anticipate a power
7
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such as China resorting to war to conquer its neighbors in the coming
decades.31 In this sense, he is broadly in agreement with defensive
realism authors who argue that expanding territory by force is a
counterproductive strategy due to the destruction caused, the
enormous risk entailed, particularly if the warring parties possess
nuclear weapons, and the resistance to occupation offered by
conquered populations.32 One could add as further factors the liberal
theory tenets of democratic peace and complex interdependence. 33
However, Mearsheimer also acknowledges that some states may still
view war as a viable option for conquering territories of particular
strategic value due to their resources or their buffer-zone status.
Accordingly, it is impossible to rule war out entirely when seeking to
anticipate the strategies of states.34
Powers tend to employ less violent methods, however, and may use
deterrence and containment strategies to curb the rise of other powers.
In this defensive role, one explainable nonetheless using the theoretical
framework of offensive realism, states may opt for balance of power or
buck-passing. Great powers may also resort to blackmail, seeking to
secure gains through coercion but without large-scale force.35 This
strategy can prove successful in interactions between a great power and
a less powerful state, but not between great powers. Lastly,
Mearsheimer refers to the strategy of bloodletting, generally in proxy
wars. Cold War examples that spring to mind are Korea, Vietnam, and
Afghanistan. Gray zone conflict accommodates both strategies blackmail and bloodletting - even if Mearsheimer does not use the term
explicitly.
Mearsheimer draws criticism for confining his analysis excessively to
military power and disregarding other instruments of coercion such as
those of an economic nature.36 In effect, offensive realism devotes less
attention to non-war strategies, despite the fact that these are the most
common at present. For this reason, recent gray zone literature
represents a positive contribution to Mearsheimer’s theory in that it
conceptually broadens the repertoire of strategies used by great powers.
Moreover, gray zone conflict theory adopts a broad interpretation of
the concept of great power. Mearsheimer’s definition of great power
refers initially to the international system level but is applicable also to
a regional perspective. This would help explain the current competitive
dynamics between regional powers in the Middle East and Asia Pacific
using the theoretical framework of offensive realism and gray zone
conflict.
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Conversely, Mearsheimer’s theory explains at the level of analysis of the
international system why states use gray zone conflict. This is an
important aspect not addressed in the majority of the literature. Thus,
when framed within offensive realism, the theorization of gray zone
conflict acquires greater explanatory solidity from the causal
perspective.

Main Lines of Strategic Action in the Gray Zone
Continuing with the literature review, this section will focus on means
and, in particular, on modes: The different lines of strategic action used
in the gray zone. It is worth emphasizing that the template provided is
not applicable to all cases. Innovation in the conception and
implementation of actions and the exploitation of specific opponent
vulnerabilities explain the differences between the various cases. 37
These strategic lines of action are designed ultimately to increase the
share of relative power, often by reducing that of the opponent. An
opponent’s power can be reduced through coercion, forcing it to accept
or do what it does not want by increasing the cost of resistance. Other
modes include degrading its decision-making process, generating
confusion and internal division to reduce its strategic effectiveness, or
weakening it by, for example, deteriorating its economy or through
proxy wars, which ultimately bleed its resources and determination.
It is worth recalling the reference made in the previous section to the
multidimensional and synchronized (hybrid) nature of these strategies.
Escalation of some lines is possible while continuing normal
cooperation on other issues of mutual interest. For example, using
third parties to interfere in the politics and media of the opponent yet
at the same time maintaining commercial ties reinforces ambiguity.
Due to their synchronized nature, these lines of action do not
necessarily follow a predefined and detailed road map. In the opinion
of some authors, Russia follows a non-linear approach, implementing
multiple actions simultaneously in the expectation that some of them,
combined with fortuitous circumstances, will generate opportunities
Moscow can capitalize on.38 Michael Kofman compares this strategy to
the business start-up approach: ‘Fail fast, fail cheap, and adjust.’39
Opportunism and adaptation to the environment take priority over the
implementation of previously structured strategies. However, the
9
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problem is Russia’s strategy lacks official documents or other forms of
evidence to prove the logic underlying Moscow’s behavior, a situation
applicable also to other actors who resort to gray zone conflict.
Although Russia’s actions appear to fit a non-linear, opportunistic, and
adaptive strategy, this interpretation is merely speculative. To add to
the complications, the ambiguous and gradual nature of gray zone
actions, coupled with the opacity of associated planning and decisionmaking processes, poses serious methodological problems for
identifying whether or not a given event is part of the aforementioned
strategies. Attribution to a pattern of behavior and to hostile intentions
is often an inference that lacks an empirical basis and increases the risk
of false positives in the detection of hybrid strategies.40 In order to
facilitate presentation, the different lines of strategic action have been
grouped under the following headings:
Political Disruption
This consists of support for anti-establishment actors in the domestic
politics of the opponent for the purpose of disrupting decision-making
processes and gaining a competitive advantage over the opponent. In
addition to media support and influence operations (discussed in the
next section), aid to these actors can be provided using direct and
indirect channels with the aim of heightening existing divisions and
eroding the legitimacy of political institutions.41
Clearly, under normal circumstances the multiplicity of actors and
complexity of problems hamper democratic governance at both state
and supranational level, for example in the European Union or the
Atlantic Alliance. Similarly, the immediacy of the present and the
short-termism dictated by election calendars can lead some to neglect
planning and long-term commitments.42 Such circumstances lend
themselves to gray zone actions aimed at causing dysfunctions in the
political decision-making processes of rivals. This is even truer where
the target state has vulnerabilities in terms of corruption, weak
institutions, serious social divisions and political polarization, factors
likely to arise in many countries due to the political and economic
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The advantage is even
greater where the actor who chooses gray zone conflict has a less
transparent and less institutionalized decision-making process, lacking
the checks and balances inherent in democratic systems, and can thus
engage in clandestine interference campaigns abroad without needing
to be accountable to its own public opinion.43
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Influence Operations
These consist of the construction and dissemination of metanarratives
to affect the political processes of other states in order to favor the
interests of the instigator of the operations and delegitimize the
opponent’s institutions. This strategic line of action is strongly
associated with the first one outlined above. The metanarratives
circulate in the public space in the form of biased or fake information
aimed at a target audience supportive of the positions of the spreader.
The use of conspiracy theories is common also. Such actions are
reinforced on social media through synergies with other individuals
and groups sharing a common adversary or similar cause.44 In the case
of Russia, the United States Intelligence Community has accused the
Internet Research Agency of attempting to influence the last
presidential election campaign and Russian Foreign Military
Intelligence (GRU) of conducting a hack and leak operation against the
Democratic Party using WikiLeaks to disseminate hacked content.45
There are also well-founded suspicions of Russian media backing for
far-right and far-left anti-EU parties and movements, as well as for the
aspirations of independence-seekers in Catalonia and even secessionist
groups in Texas.46
As noted in the previous section, present-day circumstances and future
trends afford new opportunities compared to past gray zone conflicts
such as the Cold War in which both the United States and the Soviet
Union made extensive use of influence operations.47 The multiplicity of
dissemination channels, widespread use of social networks and
advances in artificial intelligence substantially increase the scope of
such operations. The empowerment of groups and individuals, who can
coordinate with each other and act effectively and cheaply thanks to
technology, multiplies the effects of the operations.48 This dimension of
social and political change brings many positive aspects and, at the
same time, creates opportunities for gray zone strategies.49
Economic Coercion
This consists of commercial and financial practices that reinforce
political pressure. Here too different degrees exist, ranging from legal
and legitimate decisions concerning the purchase or sale of certain
products to tougher measures such as economic sanctions or
blockades.50 Examples include China’s decision to halt sales of rare
minerals temporarily to Japan in 2010 after Japanese coastguards
11
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detained Chinese fisherman in a dispute over territorial waters. A
similar incident, which shows that the starting point of the range can be
subtle levels of coercion, also occurred in 2010 when China used
lengthy inspections to delay imports of Philippine bananas. The
inspections caused the bananas to rot in docks in the Philippines and
were a means of pressuring Manila in the dispute over Scarborough
Shoal in the South China Sea.51 Still in 2010, the Chinese government
suspended purchases of Norwegian salmon following the award of the
Nobel Peace Prize to dissident Liu Xiaobo, a decision considered a
diplomatic insult by Beijing.52 Several years later, the Chinese
government used state travel agencies to divert Chinese tourism,
penalizing destinations such as South Korea (a decrease of 40 percent
in Chinese tourists) and the Republic of Palau for political reasons. 53
Cyberattacks
Here, cyberattacks on public and private entities aim not only to
intimidate and trigger confusion in political decision-making processes
but also publicly expose the adversary’s vulnerability.54 The attacks can
take various forms from temporary denials of service on institutional
websites to much more serious actions targeting critical
infrastructure.55 Also included in this category are economic cyberespionage actions by government agencies to reduce their country’s
research and development costs by appropriating advances made by
companies from other countries, an accusation frequently levelled at
the Chinese intelligence services.56 The difficulty in confirming
authorship of such episodes is due to the use of deliberately ambiguous
strategies, as noted above.57
Aggressive Intelligence Actions
Intelligence activities by states against other states are part of normal
politics.58 No matter how close their relations are, there will always be
spheres of political or economic competition where intelligence affords
a competitive advantage. However, these activities become more
aggressive in the gray zone and include multiple attempts to infiltrate
rival services, extensive cyber-espionage campaigns targeting public
and private bodies, harassment of diplomatic personnel in third
countries, and covert intelligence service operations to support political
and media interference.59 The use of a chemical weapon to poison a
former Russian intelligence agent and his daughter in the United
Kingdom in March 2018 is just one example of practices of this kind. 60
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Coercive Military Deterrence
Coercion and deterrence have traditionally been understood as, to
some degree, opposing concepts. They are, however, complementary
given that the threat of use of force can include both aims.61 Such
ambiguity can prove useful in the gray zone: A measure presented
objectively as purely deterrent and defensive contains a subtle coercive
message designed to demarcate intended spheres of influence and
achieve recognition of regional power status. Shows of strength also
occasionally include what Robert J. Art terms ‘swaggering’: A
demonstration of military capabilities for domestic and external
consumption, which makes it difficult to pin down the underlying
intentions.62 Examples include well-publicized large-scale maneuvers
near a shared border, visible testing of new weapons systems,
unprofessional interaction by vessels and aircraft with those of other
countries in close proximity, and repeated violations of neighbors’ air
or sea space.63
Faits Accomplis and Erosion Tactics
Faits accomplish are designed to achieve a specific gain in a single step
and with no intention of pulling back. Such strategies alter the status
quo suddenly and place the adversary in an uncomfortable position:
The aim is no longer for things to continue as normal but to force a
return to the previous situation. For a fait accompli to work, the gain
must be limited so the victim prefers to let matters go rather than
initiate an escalation that could end in war. Faits accomplis are a
common strategy when occupying territories disputed by two or more
states: The period between 1918 and 2007 saw 88 cases of unilateral
military occupation of territories (63 of them post-1945), 44 of them
leading to permanent territorial gains.64 Russia’s occupation of Crimea
in 2014 is a prime case of a successful fait accompli: With minimum use
of force, it shattered Ukraine’s (and even NATO’s) deterrence
strategy.65 Faits accomplis are not limited to occupation of territory and
may include other actions such as Israel’s air strikes on nuclear
facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, in both cases interrupting
proliferation programs.66 Although they involved specific use of force,
these two cases were part of gray zone conflict given that neither
escalated into an armed conflict.
For their part, erosion tactics (also called ‘salami-slicing tactics’)
involve linking together low-profile actions that achieve gradual gains
13
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 1

and, at the same time, render a severe reaction on the part of the
adversary difficult.67 To some extent, they are the sum of small faits
accomplis.68 Their small size means that the use of force is not justified
and diplomatic solutions to the dispute remain a possibility. However,
if implemented simultaneously they would trigger a crisis or even war.
They are tactics which not only secure gains but also undermine the
credibility of the opponent’s deterrence. With each movement, the
likelihood of a reaction by the adversary diminishes if it has not taken
action at the previous step.69 The most widely cited and most visually
recognizable example is Beijing’s militarization of artificial islands and
creation of air defense identification zones in the South China Sea in an
attempt to assert sovereignty over these areas.70
Faits accomplis and erosion tactics are even more attractive where the
users enjoy an advantage in a hypothetical military escalation and have
sufficient military capabilities to win at the higher level of conflict.
Staying with the previous example, China’s development of Anti
Access/Area Denial military capabilities (A2/AD) in the South China
Sea increases its likelihood of victory in a limited conflict with the US
Navy in the region and gives more scope for the country to assert itself
in the gray zone.71
Proxy Wars
Here a government or a non-state armed actor fighting a strategic rival
receives military support. The wars in Syria and Yemen throw up recent
examples of proxy wars between regional and extra-regional powers.72
The Cold War witnessed various proxy wars such as US support for
Afghan mujahedeen in their fight against Soviet occupation forces.
Another clear example of a proxy war is Pakistan’s traditional support
for armed groups fighting India in Kashmir.73
The conflict dyad takes places in the gray zone, as there is no direct and
acknowledged combat between the two states. Like the other strategic
lines of action, a gradual progression from small to large is possible:
From providing financial support and refuge to a third party to
facilitating action by private military companies as foreign policy
instruments or deploying military forces as non-combatant assessors.
In the most extreme cases, own forces may be used on a small scale,
fighting as ‘volunteers’ or under false nationalities in the theatre of
operations, as was the case of the Russian pilots who fought in the 1951
Korean War or in the war of attrition between Egypt and Israel in
14
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1971.74 However, due to the size of the forces used, the direct and
unacknowledged intervention by Russia in the Donbass war in August
2014 is a covert armed conflict rather than a gray zone one in the strict
sense of the term.75

Escalation in Gray Zone Conflicts
Similar to conflict phenomena, gray zone disputes can escalate or deescalate. Confrontation is fluid, with highs and lows in the intensity of
the lines of strategic action. We can identify the following levels of
escalation, ranked from least to greatest intensity in terms of
attribution and intrusion.
Environment Shaping
This is the lowest level in terms of coercion, attrition, and degradation
of the opponent’s decision-making process. The aim is to shape the
environment to exert power over the rival. It is also the most
ambiguous level of escalation. As noted earlier, the difficulty in
delineating the contours of gray zone conflict arises on the border
between this type of conflict and peaceful (white) competition, which
includes abundant economic coercion and espionage actions, influence
operations and diverse modes of exercising soft power.76 Each of these
actions forms part of the competition between states to increase their
relative share of power, but in accordance with commonly accepted
parameters of international politics.
However, other actions go a step further and cross the boundaries
considered normal, acceptable, and even legal in inter-state relations.
Examples include the repeated dissemination of fake news and
conspiracy theories to delegitimize the rival with particular impact on
the extremes of the political spectrum; political exploitation of
minorities or ethnic groups in other countries; military intimidation;
corruption of public officials; and other practices corresponding to the
lines of action described in the previous section.
In this first phase, the level of intensity and aggressiveness of the
hybrid strategies is low and the actual effects in terms of coercion,
attrition, and degradation of the decision-making process are therefore
limited. However, persistence over time generates cumulative effects
and paves the way for decisive actions in a subsequent escalation. An
analogy can be drawn in some respects between this level of escalation
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and phase zero of US military operations planning (shape the
environment), where the aim is to create and maintain conditions that
favor greater exercise of power over the opponent.77
Interference
At this level of escalation, the type of action and more intensive
implementation of hybrid strategies place the conflict fully within the
gray area. Pursuit of the aforementioned objectives (coercion, attrition,
and degradation of the opponent’s decision-making process) is more
aggressive. Since the existence of a gray zone is clearer, many of the
activities are covert and are carried out by intelligence services or via
third parties to render attribution, deterrence, and response difficult.
Irrespective of their actual effects, these actions are noticeably more
intrusive and occupy political bandwidth, exploit opponent
vulnerabilities, and heighten social divisions. Also included in this level
of escalation are intimidatory cyber-attacks targeting critical
infrastructure, the use of ‘naval militias’ and salami tactics to subvert
the territorial status quo, economic coercion to condition the foreign
policy of another state, and demonstrations of military might during a
crisis. Although anonymity cannot be guaranteed in all cases, it is
possible to camouflage the hostility of such actions by using nongovernmental actors or justifying the actions on the alleged legitimacy
of the goals.
Destabilization
At this level, gray zone actors escalate hybrid strategic lines of action
even further to generate serious dysfunctions in the opponent’s
political, social, and economic system, increasing attrition and thus
making them more vulnerable to coercion. Here we enter the terrain of
hard-hitting economic sanctions and blockades, large-scale cyberattacks, covert support for violent and/or revolutionary political
opposition groups, terrorist organizations that attack the opponent and
even armed militias with territorial control. This level can become the
zone immediately prior to armed conflict. In the ‘Gerasimov doctrine’
(a misnomer), the chief of staff of Russia’s armed forces cited the
example equivalent to this phase of the military aid provided by the
West to rebels in Libya, which eventually led to the fall of the Gaddafi
regime.78
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Direct, Limited, and Sporadic Use of Force
This is the highest level in terms of attribution within this strategic line
of action prior to open armed conflict and the highest level of escalation
in the gray zone. It is often a pre-war situation in which the parties
nonetheless endeavor to avoid escalating matters to the level of armed
conflict. The heightened tensions between the United States and Iran
during 2019-2020 fit this category. Examples include Iran’s shooting
down of the Global Hawk surveillance drone in June 2019 and the
assassination of General Soleimani by the United States in January
2020, to which Iran responded by launching ballistic missiles against
Iraqi bases where American soldiers were stationed.
Deserving of mention also are two extreme cases of ‘limited’ use of
force: The faits accomplis of Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland
Islands in April 1982 and Russia’s occupation of Crimea in February
2014. In the latter, Moscow correctly calculated that Kiev would not
respond militarily whereas in the former the invasion brought
unanticipated consequences for Argentina. The country’s military
government wrongly assumed there would be no strong reaction by the
United Kingdom and that occupation of the islands would give it an
advantage in negotiations to de-escalate the crisis. However, the
calculation proved misguided and the conflict escalated from gray zone
to actual war.
Conflict in the gray zone can escalate or de-escalate along this
continuum (shaping – interference – destabilization – limited use of
force) although actors may prolong a particular phase deliberately.
Shaping and interference are, for obvious reasons, the most persistent
phases as they require fewer resources on the part of the aggressor and
entail fewer costs in terms of potential retaliation. Both phases can last
for years and even decades, as occurred throughout the Cold War.

Conclusion
The comprehensive and synchronized use of strategic lines of action
combined with the different levels of escalation offers advantages to an
actor who resorts to the gray zone over a rival whose defensive strategy
is based on classic, linear, and inflexible military deterrence rather than
on the gradualism and ambiguity of gray zone conflict. In the short
term, losses are not as heavy and the threat is not sufficiently clear or
serious to abandon deterrence and diplomacy.79 For this reason, when
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faced with hybrid gray zone strategies, deterrence requires new
approaches in terms of, for example, agility, coherence,
communication, capacity, resolve, resilience, attribution, and solidarity
among allies.
However, taking a conflict into the gray zone is not without risk or cost
and indeed can end up generating reactions by other countries that
ultimately weaken the military, political, and economic position of the
instigator.80 In extreme cases, gains secured through ambiguity and
gradualism can lead the instigator to miscalculate the seriousness of
the opponent’s red lines and the credibility of its deterrence.81 Mistaken
perceptions of the asymmetry of interests can backfire on the aggressor
in the gray zone if its actions jeopardize interests deemed vital or
existential by the opponent. A detailed study of the strategies for
responding to gray zone actions is beyond the scope of this article.
However, it is important to emphasize that responses to hybrid actions
in the gray zone need to be multidimensional, integrated, and
synergistic, in keeping with the comprehensive approach but adapting
mindsets to the specific characteristics of this particular type of
conflict.82
A review of existing literature has helped delineate the gray zone
conceptually and outline its main lines of action, thus furthering our
understanding of short-of-war conflicts, which are active today and are
likely to continue in the mid- to long- term. The article has framed the
structural origins of gray zone conflicts within John Mearsheimer’s
offensive realism. In this way, the gray zone becomes an almost natural
complement to the theory of offensive realism.
The empirical validation used by Mearsheimer to underpin his theory
focused on great power politics of the last one hundred and fifty years,
a period in which war occupied a prominent place. However, the last
chapter of the book on relations between the great powers in the 21st
century focused on future changes in the distribution of power and the
associated tensions; the strategies of the great powers received little
attention. The research presented here helps fill this gap by offering a
theoretical framework to analyze rivalry between today’s great powers.
The framework may help enrich existing lines of research such as the
study of relations between Russia, the United States and European
countries, the growing rivalry in the Asia Pacific region, or the battle
between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey for supremacy in the Middle
East. Lastly, in establishing a linkage to the theory of offensive realism,
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the research helps remedy a shortcoming in current scientific literature
on gray zone conflict, which acknowledges the existence of competition
between great powers but does not dwell on the ulterior motives.
Situating gray zone conflict within the framework of offensive realism
gives it a coherent structural explanation.
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